1 Claudio Dicembrino is an Economist at the Strategic Planning and M&A division of Enel SpA and Research Fellow at CEIS (Center for Economic and International Studies) -University of Rome "Tor Vergata". The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not involve any institutions of affiliation. All other usual disclaimers apply. 20 ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/DICEMBRINO_2_2011 II) 2 . The overestimation of regulators of the ability of financial firms to manage situations of financial distresses, and the corresponding underestimation of minimum capital requirements, represent weakness that has to be considered to fully understand the macroeconomic forces underlying financial soundness. Second, the exponential development of derivative instruments has complicated the evaluation of risky assets in any field of financial engineering, shedding light on the unreliability of current model-based risk assessments (i.e. CAPM and VaR 3 ). It has contributed to generating a parallel hidden banking system with reduced information about the size or origin of credit risks, highlighting a lack of transparency in many segments of the international financial system. In this regard, a special role has been played by the sudden growth of Over-the-Counter credit derivatives markets. Even if these markets were initially envisaged as a powerful risk management instrument mitigating the likely negative states of nature, in reality they have in fact spread the threat of systemic risk. Third, the "originate-to-distribute" model has created huge possibilities and incentives for speculators, diverting attention of the solvency capacity of third-party counterparts (Van den End, 2009 ).
Despite the importance of having a comprehensive knowledge of this phenomenon, the literature fails to provide an exhaustive understanding of measuring the effects and magnitude of systemic failure, both from a horizontal perspective (spreading of the crisis among institutions, banks and firms) and from a vertical perspective (the deep of the crisis and which agents will be involved, from big investment funds to 2 As expressed in Acharya et al. (2010) "Basel I and Basel II are designed to limit each institution's risk seen in isolation; they are not sufficiently focused on systemic risk even though systemic risk is often the rationale provided for such regulation". • The distress dependence matrix: this model studies the probability of default of a pair of banks, taking into account a panel of financial banks. Through this method, it is possible to assess the probability of a financial institution experiencing distress conditional on another institution that shows clear signs of financial trouble.
Goodhart and Segoviano (2008) offer a brilliant contribution to this technique;
• The default intensity model: this model is able to capture the probability of default of a large part of financial institutions through linkages among certain institutions.
These kinds of models are worked out in terms of default rate jumps that occur in failure events, reflecting the increased likelihood of further events due to spillover effects. In this regard Giesecke et al. (2009) global financial shocks for a subset of banks that are not directly exposed 7 to the shock. Stock market reactions of an unexposed bank to the shock will be interpreted as a measure of systemic risk. The second approach is given by an assessment of the default probabilities of banks during a time of crisis. In order to 7 Bertrand et al. (2005) argue that in efficient capital markets, negative information (as 9/11) will affect bank performances that are exposed to the events in question. Unexposed banks will be unaffected by these effects. ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/DICEMBRINO_2_2011 estimate the probabilities of default they take into consideration a structural model, an idea of default developed by Merton (1974) estimated from an observed series of equity prices. In the third and last approach Bartram et al. (2005) follow the estimation procedure applied by Duan (2000), Duan et al. 8 (2003) , and Camara 9
(2004) assessing systemic risk in the banking system through the probability of bank default implied in their equity option prices. One of the most recent contribution of this class of indicators is provided by Capuano (2008) , developing a framework to derive a market-based measure of probability of default. This probability of default is defined as the probability that the value of the underlying asset will fall below a given threshold value that constitutes the default barrier itself. As a contrast to Merton's 8 Duan et al. (2003) derive a maximum-likelihood approach where the likelihood function for the equity value of the firms is derived in a structural model framework. Through maximizing this function, it is possible to obtain the implied default probabilities of the firm.
9 Camara (2004) develops an option pricing model in which asset prices follow a geometric random walk but may jump to zero (bankruptcy) with a finite probability distribution.
